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The Rise of China and South Korea: Sunshine and Beyond 
 
David Hundt 
School of International and Political Studies, Deakin University, Melbourne 
 
While China’s re-emergence at both the regional and global levels has attracted much attention, a 
less discernible development has been South Korea’s bid to adopt a more robust foreign policy. 
For the decade following the establishment of bilateral relations with the mainland in 1992, South 
Korea viewed China as a valuable partner that could facilitate its foreign policy goals. Although 
differing in ambition and capacity, in several respects—their preferred methods of resolving the 
North Korean nuclear crisis, their expanding trade and investment, and their scepticism about 
Japanese intentions—the regional perspectives of China and South Korea proved to be highly 
complementary. However, closer ties with China complicate Korea’s relations with the United 
States, whose regional leadership China is beginning to challenge. In light of the adverse impact 
of the rise of China on the Korea–US alliance and other developments (notably the dispute 
involving the Goguryeo kingdom), South Korea’s views of China have cooled. This paper traces 
the Korean debate about the rise of China and its implications. 
 
Introduction 
The Korean Peninsula has long been a venue and object of rivalry among the 
great powers of the Asia–Pacific.1 China and Japan, Korea’s neighbours to the 
east and west respectively, have used the peninsula to launch bids for regional 
dominance on numerous occasions over the millennia. In more recent times, the 
peninsula served as one of the main theatres of the Cold War. Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union succored client states on the peninsula after 1945, 
setting in train the division of Korea that endures to this day. The peninsula has 
consequently witnessed the emergence of great powers, the most recent of 
which is China. A complication surrounding the ‘rise of China’ is its impact on the 
extant regional order, whereby the United States—an extra-regional power—
exercises leadership by dint of its decades-long system of bilateral alliances. This 
‘San Francisco system’ of alliances includes the mutual defence treaty signed 
with the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) in 1953. 
 
The ROK is one of the most successful third-wave democracies that emerged in 
the 1980s. South Korea also has, over the past four decades, recorded some of 
the most rapid and sustained rates of economic growth in the world. Moreover, 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions on how to improve this paper. 
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the South has developed substantial soft power resources via its filmmakers and 
television producers. These elements of Korean society accord with the 
‘package’ of values that the US has promoted since the end of World War II. 
However it is a final component of the ROK’s quest to join the ranks of the 
world’s foremost states—an independent foreign policy—that has caused some 
disquiet in Washington. In particular the pursuit of what Kim Dae-jung termed the 
Sunshine Policy has put strain on the US alliance. 
 
The Sunshine Policy set aside the political differences between the Koreas. An 
article of faith—and indeed a founding principle of the ROK’s Constitution—was 
to deny the North’s existence as a separate state and as a mode of political 
organisation that was distinct from the South. For this reason Bruce Cumings has 
argued that Kim has done ‘more to change policy toward the North than any 
previous South Korea or US president’.2 The Sunshine Policy’s focus was on 
achieving reconciliation as a preparatory step to national unification. As such it 
emphasised re-establishing personal ties, especially among families separated 
by the civil war, as well as investment by the South in North Korea. Roh Moo-
hyun, with just months remaining in his term as president, restated his view of the 
Sunshine Policy in late 2007: ‘We do not want to achieve unification through 
absorption of the North; neither do we consider it feasible’.3 Roh, along with his 
successor, Lee Myung-bak, committed the ROK to the goal of aiding the North’s 
economic recovery—a stance at odds with previous governments’ pursuit of total 
victory over communism. While Lee has attached stronger conditions to 
humanitarian aid and demanded greater transparency about the North’s use of 
nuclear power, the Sunshine Policy has become the mainstream of South 
Korea’s approach to its northern counterpart. 
 
                                                 
2 Bruce Cumings, ‘Creating Korean Insecurity: The US Role’, in Hazel Smith, ed., Reconstituting 
Korean Security: A Policy Primer (New York: United Nations University, 2007), 28. 
3 Quoted in Andrei Lankov, ‘Staying Alive: Why North Korea will not Change’, Foreign Affairs 87, 
no. 2 (2008), 11. 
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This paper seeks to document changing perceptions in the ROK about China’s 
involvement in inter-Korean relations. Opinion polls and statements by the South 
Korean government have generally reflected a positive view of China, but more 
recently China has been viewed as a possible impediment to the goal of 
unification. Why have suspicions about China’s intentions arisen? Are such 
suspicions justified, or were South Korea’s expectations of China simply too high 
to begin with? Does China see a unified Korea as potentially too pro-US and thus 
seek to support a China-leaning North? In assessing the efficacy of Sino–ROK 
policy coordination, this paper assumes that the two parties view the North in 
quite different ways. Each seeks to coax the North out of its isolation, but there 
the similarities end. This paper thus seeks to illustrate both the achievements 
and limits of policy coordination, and the options that the ROK and China have if 
that coordination proves ineffective. 
 
Economic Assistance 
The Sunshine Policy, as noted above, marked a break from the past for South 
Korea and its relations with the North. For the first time, the ROK sought to offer 
concessions to the North with minimal strings attached: under Kim Dae-jung, 
South Korea offered substantial food and energy assistance and encouraged 
investments in the North in order to respond to the humanitarian crisis that had 
engulfed the DPRK during the mid-1990s. In June 2000, Kim Dae-jung’s visit to 
Pyongyang for the first summit between the leaders of North and South Korea 
only underlined the historical significance of the Sunshine Policy.4 
 
The unilateral concessions underpinning Sunshine were aimed at buying the 
trust of the North. While foreswearing the ‘unification by force’ option that had 
dominated previous South Korean approaches to the North, Sunshine instead 
sought to change the North from within. That is, instead of imposing ‘regime 
change’ from the outside, the Sunshine Policy sought to encourage North 
                                                 
4 Cumings, ‘Creating Korean Insecurity’, 29. Roh Moo-hyun, Kim’s successor, also visited the 
North for a summit late in his term in office. 
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Koreans to change their own government. Unsurprisingly, the Pyongyang regime 
was alert to the threat and denounced what it perceived as the promotion of 
counter-revolutionary forces. 
 
China in contrast had, by this time, undergone two decades of self-administered 
Sunshine Policy, and encouraged the North to reform its economy in order to 
ensure that power remained in the hands of the Workers Party. Of all the 
surviving communist states, North Korea would seem the best suited to the 
‘China model’ of cautious economic opening coupled with the retention of tight 
political control. China’s assistance to Pyongyang, and its attempts to have the 
North emulate the Chinese model, predated the Sunshine Policy by many years. 
Indeed, the Sunshine Policy built on China’s efforts to stabilise the North since 
the loss of Soviet subsidies in 1991. For instance China has supplied about one 
third of the energy and food imports to the North during that period. The DPRK’s 
dependence on China has grown even further in recent years, with Pyongyang’s 
share of China’s foreign assistance reaching about 40 percent in 2007. A recent 
study estimates that China has supplied about 50,000 tonnes of oil to the North 
each month on a concessionary basis.5 
 
The loss of subsidised imports, Andrei Lankov claims, reduced industrial 
production to half its previous levels. Furthermore the public distribution system, 
which provided the North Korean populace with food supplies, became 
dysfunctional and forced the citizenry to turn to private markets to supplement 
food stocks. In response, it is estimated that China has provided about 1 million 
tons of wheat and rice.6 
 
                                                 
5 Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder and John S. Park, Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor: 
Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute 
of Peace, 2008), 11. Cited with permission. 
6 Lankov, ‘Staying Alive’, 9; David Shambaugh, ‘China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the 
Long Term’, Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2003), 45–6. On the collapse of the public 
distribution system, see also Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: 
Markets, Aid and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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With wages low and basic foodstuffs not readily available, North Koreans began 
to surreptitiously cross the border into China in search of food, employment and 
money. While illegal and tantamount to treason, both governments turned a blind 
eye to such activity in order to alleviate food shortages. The main issue was that 
the cross-border flows be kept out of the limelight, and that ‘economic migrants’ 
not undermine morale in the North by launching audacious escapes to third 
countries. According to Hazel Smith, ‘cross-border illegality’ takes the form of not 
only economic migration, but also ‘trafficking in women, armed robbery and night-
time theft, and smuggling’.7 Smith estimates that 30,000 North Koreans reside 
illegally in China. 
 
The pragmatic element of Kim Dae-jung’s approach to the North became evident 
from the outset. In the wake of the financial crisis of 1997–8, the South 
abandoned any pretence that it could absorb North Korea, either by force or as a 
result of regime collapse. The ROK ruled out a ‘hard landing’ scenario and 
instead sought to lay the groundwork for a ‘soft landing’, which would entail the 
promotion of trade and investment in the North in order to reduce the future 
burden on a united Korea. Abetting the trans-border flows of economic migrants 
into China or on to third countries, the ROK calculated, would alleviate some of 
the pressure on the North’s economy. This, according to the results of surveys 
conducted into public attitudes towards aid dispensation, was a policy with 
growing popular support. Whereas only one quarter of the ROK’s population 
supported economic aid to the North in 1995, by 2007 that figure had more than 
doubled.8 
 
                                                 
7 Hazel Smith, ‘Reconstituting Korean Security Dilemmas’, in Hazel Smith, ed., Reconstituting 
Korean Security: A Policy Primer (New York: United Nations University, 2007), 13. Almost 10,000 
North Koreans have successfully sought refuge in the South since the mid-1990s. See Peter 
Beck, Gail Kim and Donald Macintyre, ‘Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China’, 
in Rüdiger Frank, James E. Hoare, Patrick Köllner and Susan Pares, eds, Korea Yearbook: 
Politics, Economy and Society (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007), 269–71. 
8 Lankov, ‘Staying Alive’, 16. 
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However the flow of migrants took on a dynamic of its own. NGOs linked to 
religious groups in South Korea and the US sought to expedite the flight of North 
Korean migrants to third countries. China had sanctioned the practice of refugees 
receiving asylum provided that minimal fanfare accompanied their exit—and 
provided that Chinese law enforcement authorities were consulted. A series of 
mass attempts to gain asylum occurred in the early 2000s, as North Koreans 
gained access to diplomatic compounds or schools operated by foreign 
governments in China. The PRC began a harsh crackdown, and forcibly 
repatriated some asylum seekers. For instance Chinese authorities repatriated 
about 6,000 North Koreans in the first wave of expulsions in 2000, while a 
second campaign, in the winter of 2002 netted over 3,200 refugees. A further 
sweep, in late 2003, resulted in hundreds of North Koreans being repatriated.9 
 
The PRC, sensitive to issues of sovereignty, prevented international 
organisations such as the United National Human Right Commission from 
operating within its borders. In this sense, the limits of cooperation—and policy 
compatibility—became evident. For China, the issue was one of providing 
economic aid to a destitute neighbour and ally. Once economic migrants sought 
to become political refugees, China’s policy changed abruptly. For the ROK, in 
contrast, the matter was largely humanitarian in character, with the goal of 
gradually improving living standards in the North at the forefront. In turn, the logic 
of Sunshine Policy saw gradual change evolving within the North as a precursor 
to reconciliation. This made problematic China’s longstanding alliance with 
Pyongyang, necessarily limiting the degree of policy alignment with the ROK. 
 
The nuclear program 
While opposing the North’s acquisition of a nuclear capacity, Kim and his 
successor Roh Moo-hyun viewed inter-Korean relations and talks to rid North 
Korea of its nuclear weapons as two sides of the same coin. The South thus 
ruled out the use of force to resolve the nuclear issue, and argued that even 
                                                 
9 Refer to Beck, Kim and Macintyre, ‘Perilous Journeys’, 251. 
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discussing such an option was detrimental to prospects for reconciliation. The 
ROK, backed by China, called on the surrounding powers to offer a substantial 
package to the North prior to the dismantlement of its nuclear programme. It 
adopted a position that was much closer to that of China than the US.10 
 
The Bush administration argued that North Korea had not met its obligations to 
disarm under the Geneva Accords of 1994. Furthermore, Bush viewed the 
North’s efforts to acquire a deterrent in the context of the war on terror. Rather 
than entering into another round of protracted negotiations towards the North’s 
eventual disarmament, the administration suspended negotiations with 
Pyongyang on a number of fronts.11 The US claimed that the North had procured 
a ‘highly enriched uranium’ (HEU) programme from Dr AQ Khan’s illicit supplier 
network. In late 2002, the Bush administration charged that, in addition to the 
conventional refining programme that the North had suspended and put under 
IAEA supervision at Yongbyon, the Kim regime was operating an HEU 
programme. The North initially denied the charge, and responded by reactivating 
its Yongbyon reactor, expelling the IAEA inspectors, and switching off the 
cameras that had monitored the reactor for the previous eight years. Furthermore 
the regime announced that it would quit the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In 
early 2003 the North began to reprocess the spent fuel rods that had been stored 
under IAEA supervision. It also appears that the North then connected the power 
generation programmes at Yongbyon to the HEU reprocessing programme, 
giving it the capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium.12 
 
With the Bush administration’s strategic focus turning to Iraq, the problem of 
North Korea’s suspected weapons capacity fell primarily to South Korea and 
                                                 
10 Robert S. Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and 
Balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006), 380–1. 
11 The US and the North negotiated on at least 20 separate issues between 1993 and 2000, with 
most achieving satisfactory outcomes. See Robert Carlin, ‘Negotiating with North Korea: Lessons 
Learned and Forgotten’, in Rüdiger Frank, James E. Hoare, Patrick Köllner and Susan Pares, 
eds, Korea Yearbook: Politics, Economy and Society (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007), 251. 
12 Cumings, ‘Creating Korean Insecurity’, 33–4. 
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China, who framed the matter as a technical issue of denuclearisation rather than 
a political issue of ‘regime change’. Both clearly stated their opposition to the 
North’s acquiring nuclear weapons, arguing that there was no justification for 
such a development. China and the ROK thus took leading roles in the Six Party 
Talks, which brought together the Koreas, Japan, the US, China and Russia. 
However talks came to a halt in late 2005 when it was revealed that, under 
pressure from the US Treasury, the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) had 
frozen funds totalling $25 million in accounts held by the North Korean 
government and its trading companies. The North responded to the freezing of its 
funds by threatening to test, sell and use nuclear weapons. Although both China 
and the ROK warned the North not to make any provocative moves, it continued 
to try their patience by first testing missiles in July 2006, and then detonating a 
small nuclear device in October.13 
 
While Chinese officials were given about 20 minutes’ warning of the test, it 
nonetheless caused severe embarrassment given their public statements that the 
North should not test a weapon. In the wake of the test, South Korea and China 
engaged in some of their harshest criticism of the North. Given the political and 
economic capital that both China and the ROK had invested in the North, finding 
an appropriate way in which to punish the North would be crucial. Despite the 
embarrassment that the test caused China in terms of its aspirations to regional 
leadership, the PRC was unwilling to abandon the North outright. For instance on 
October 24 Hu Jintao said that China had no plan to stop aid to the North, 
despite the nuclear test. China’s fear was that curtailing aid would increase the 
chances of a collapse in the North, resulting in unknowable chaos in the border 
region. China supported United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, which 
imposed limited sanctions on the North just days after the nuclear test.14 
                                                 
13 See International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout (Asia Briefing no. 56, 
13 November 2006) and After the North Korea Nuclear Breakthrough: Compliance or 
Confrontation? (Asia Briefing no. 62, 30 April 2007). 
14 Scott Snyder, ‘Responses to North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Capitulation or Collective Action?’ 
Washington Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2007), 35. 
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A poll conducted in mid-2006, as speculation about a test grew, found that most 
South Koreans believed that the North was pursuing—or had already acquired—
a nuclear capacity, but they did not consider the likelihood of a North Korean 
attack to be high. Instead they viewed the North’s acquisition of such a capacity 
to be a deterrent against an American attack and a bargaining tool.15 This 
confirms the analysis of non-traditional security experts such as Hazel Smith, 
who argue that Pyongyang’s acquisition of a nuclear capacity is a cheap—albeit 
risky—way to ward off the threat of invasion.16 
 
The South Korean public appeared to appreciate China’s efforts to dissuade the 
North from detonating a weapon. For instance one poll, conducted in the months 
following the North’s nuclear test, suggested that South Koreans viewed the US 
and China as equally capable of influencing world events in an effective manner. 
Koreans were more likely to consider the US to have a greater ‘positive influence’ 
in world affairs than China (35 percent as opposed to 32 percent). China, on the 
other hand, was seen to be the cause of fewer problems: only 48 percent of 
Koreans thought China had a ‘negative influence’ while a majority—54 percent—
thought the US had a negative impact.17 
 
The South Korean government faced a domestic backlash following the nuclear 
test. The Roh government’s critics argued that the ROK had subsidised the 
development of the North’s nuclear arsenal through humanitarian and economic 
aid under the auspices of the Sunshine Policy. Conservative critics called for 
                                                 
15 Cheoleon Lee, ‘Gallup World Poll: South Korea’s Political Dilemma’ (22 September 2006), at: 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/24679/Gallup-World-Poll-South-Koreas-Political-Dilemma.aspx. Note: 
In this paper, the names of Korean and Chinese authors are presented in the format for which 
they have indicated a preference—which, in English-language publications, tends to be a ‘first 
name, surname’ order. When no preference is indicated or detectable—and when discussing 
political leaders—names are presented in the conventional ‘surname, first name’ order. 
16 Smith, ‘Reconstituting Korean Security Dilemmas’, 6–7. 
17 BBC, ‘Israel and Iran share Most Negative Ratings in Global Poll’ (BBC World Service Poll, 27 
January 2007), at: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/325.php?nid= 
&id=&pnt=325&lb=hmpg1. 
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policy realignment, with many advocating the reversion to the ROK’s traditional 
hard-line approach to the North. The Roh government bowed to its critics by 
replacing Lee Jong-seok as Unification Minister with an official willing to take a 
firmer line on the North and by suspending shipments of food aid until North 
Korea showed signs of remorse for its actions.18 
 
In February 2007, China brokered an agreement for a phased nuclear freeze 
whereby the North would be rewarded for each step it took toward disarmament. 
That is, it would receive aid in return for specific actions rather than just the 
promise of them. The crux of the deal was that the US agreed to release the BDA 
funds in return for the North shutting Yongbyon (again), and declaring all its 
nuclear programmes and weapons caches by the end of 2007. The nuclear issue 
proved to be an area in which Chinese and Korean views were largely 
unanimous. The ROK shared China’s preference for a peaceful resolution to the 
crisis, even if it did complicate the American alliance. 
 
History matters 
A third touchstone in Sino–Korean approaches to the North has emerged in the 
form of the history dispute engulfing China and the two Koreas. The dispute 
erupted in 2003 between China and South Korea revolving around the historical 
ownership of the Goguryeo kingdom. Goguryeo is of great historical importance 
to Korea, being one the three kingdoms (along with Silla and Baekche) that 
Korean historians claim later unified and formed the Koryo dynasty in the seventh 
century AD. The issue stemmed from North Korea’s attempt to have Goguryeo 
murals listed by UNESCO as a site worthy of world heritage protection. China 
responded by asking UNESCO to list Goguryeo castles and tombs, thereby 
explicitly stating that Goguryeo belonged to China. It also launched the 
                                                 
18 Snyder, ‘Responses to North Korea’s Nuclear Test’, 37. 
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‘Northeast Asia History Project’ to head off any irredentist instincts in a united 
Korea that might covet the ethnic Korean regions of Manchuria.19 
 
China claimed that the Goguryeo kingdom was but one territory that formed part 
of the traditional Chinese empire. In this worldview, China is a multicultural nation 
that has readily absorbed minority nations into its history and culture. Everything 
now within Chinese territory belongs to China, and every history that has evolved 
inside Chinese realms belongs exclusively to China. Consequently it was a 
cause for consternation for Koreans when China appeared to lay claim to not 
only Goguryeo but also the Gojoseon, Gando and Balhae kingdoms.20 
 
The problem here is that modern conceptions of the nation-state, which imply 
that an autonomous state enjoys exclusive sovereignty over a fixed territory and 
a population sharing a common language or culture, were applied to events that 
took place more than two millennia ago, when borders and sovereignty were far 
looser concepts. Indeed, as Larisa Zabrovskaya argues, the Sino–Korean border 
was only formalised along its current terms early in the 20th century. As recently 
as the mid-19th century, the only ‘border’ between China and Korea lay in the 
Amnok (Yalu) and Tumen (Tuman) rivers, allowing a relatively free flow of people 
between the countries. It was only growing Chinese concerns about the 
encroachment of Russia and Japan into Manchuria that encouraged a more 
formal policing of the border regions.21 
                                                 
19 Taeho Kim, ‘Sino–ROK Relations at a Crossroads: Looming Tensions amid Growing 
Interdependence’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 17, no. 1 (2005), 142–3. 
20 Go Seong-bin, ‘Jungguk-ui Hanguk-e daeHan Insik: Sujikjeok Insik-eul neomeoseo 
Supyeongjeok Insik-euro-ui Baljeon Jeonmang (China’s Perceptions of Korea: Prospects of 
Advancing beyond Vertical Perceptions to Horizontal Perceptions)’, Gukka Jeollyak (National 
Strategy) 12, no. 4 (2006), 112–13; Ki-Ho Song, ‘China’s Attempt at “Stealing” Parts of Ancient 
Korean History’, Review of Korean Studies 7, no. 4 (2004), 95, 110; Pankaj Mohan, ‘China’s 
Northeast Asia Project (Tongbuk Kongjong) and the Reality of Kogoryo’, in Changzoo Song and 
Inshil Choe Yoon, eds, Intellectual Engagements with Korea: Diversity in Korean Studies in 
Australasia (University of Auckland: Korean Studies Association of Australasia, 2005), 80–5. 
21 Larisa Zabrovskaya, ‘A Brief History of the Sino–Korean Border from the 18th Century to the 
20th Century’, in Rüdiger Frank, James E. Hoare, Patrick Köllner and Susan Pares, eds, Korea 
Yearbook: Politics, Economy and Society (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007), 285–6. Since some 
sections of the rivers are shallow, until just a few years ago it was possible for North Koreans to 
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China’s attempts to appropriate the history of Goguryeo sparked a torrid 
response from South Korea, leading to a compromise whereby China agreed to 
publicly withdraw its claims. While not ceding any ground on the issue of 
historical ownership of the Goguryeo and Palhae kingdoms, China instead 
suggested that the history dispute be resolved through academic exchanges. 
One suggestion was that the kingdoms be conceived as part of a ‘shared history’ 
(ilsa yangyong) that both China and Korea could recollect in their own manner.22 
 
The incident raised doubts in South Korea about the intentions of China. Some 
commentators warned of China’s hegemonic ambitions in the region, arguing that 
the Goguryeo issue was evidence that China perceived itself as the region’s 
natural heavyweight and that it was insensitive to the interests of other 
countries.23 One school of thought was that China’s claims to historical 
ownership over the border regions presaged an intervention in North Korea in the 
case of regime collapse—or even a Chinese-sponsored regime change, should 
the Kim Jong Il government adopt policies inimical with Chinese interests.24 
 
In any case the history dispute reinforced fears in the ROK that China views itself 
as the region’s natural hegemon, and that China—when it deems necessary—
could again override Korean interests.25 This has undermined confidence that 
China would treat the ROK as a meaningful player in Northeast Asia. Just as 
China has raised the emotive issue of sovereignty to justify its stance on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
cross into China undetected. However border security has subsequently been strengthened in 
response to the heightened political sensitivity resulting from the presence of asylum seekers in 
northern China. Refer to Beck, Kim and Macintyre, ‘Perilous Journeys’, 257–8. 
22 Ha Do-hyeong, ‘Han–Jung Jeongsang Huidam-ui Seonggwa-wa Uimi (Results and 
Significance of the ROK–China Summit Meeting)’, Jeongse-wa Jeongchaek (Trends and Policy) 
November 2006, 12. 
23 See for instance Scott Snyder, ‘A Turning Point for China–Korea Relations?’ Comparative 
Connections 6, no. 3 (2004), 109–11. 
24 Song, ‘China’s Attempt at “Stealing” Parts of Ancient Korean History’, 110. 
25 Go, ‘Jungguk-ui Hanguk-e daeHan Insik’, 114. 
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North Korean refugees within its borders, the ROK has used the Goguryeo 
controversy to champion the cause of Korean sovereignty—and to remind China 
and other outside powers that it will not welcome a renewed bout of great power 
rivalry over the peninsula. 
 
Debating the Rise of China 
The history dispute has soured Korean opinion of China somewhat. China’s rise 
has caused some consternation in Korea due to an expectation that China will 
pay scant regard to Korean interests. For instance some scholars have detected 
a shift in China’s foreign policy, with the re-emergence of the notion of ‘pan-
Asianism’. Herein, China would present itself as the Asian representative in a 
broader confrontation with the West. Implicit here would be China’s displacing 
Japan as the most powerful Asian state, and also displacing the US as the 
region’s dominant power.26 While less offensive to Korean sensibilities than the 
depiction of China as the Middle Kingdom, pan-Asianism would necessarily 
relegate Korea to a second-order position behind a resurgent China. Ross thus 
discusses Korea and Taiwan in the context of ‘secondary state alignment’, 
whereby small and medium powers accommodate the rise of new great 
powers.27 
 
According to Baogang He, accommodation includes ‘not only contact and 
engagement, but also recognition of and adjustment to the needs of others. In 
substantive terms, accommodation is more about mutual adaptation on equal 
terms’.28 And yet evidence suggests that Koreans are rethinking the place of 
China in the making of foreign policy, especially in terms of North Korea. In light 
of the history dispute, a range of other issues, previously overlooked, appeared 
to take on new resonance. For instance, the ‘yellow dust’ phenomenon, whereby 
                                                 
26 See for instance Go, ‘Jungguk-ui Hanguk-e daeHan Insik’, 106–07. 
27 Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China’, 387–9. 
28 Baogang He, ‘Politics of International Accommodation of the Rise of China’ (Paper presented to 
Australasian Political Science Association Conference, Melbourne, 24–6 September 2007), 2. 
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sands from the Gobi Desert in Northwest China blow into the Pacific Ocean via 
Korean and Japanese airspace, receives ample news coverage. Korean health 
officials have attributed incidences of respiratory disease to the dust. Likewise, 
an incident involving a Chinese diplomat who refused to submit to a breath test in 
Seoul during early 2007 has received greater coverage in light of tensions with 
China. Finally, the Korean press has highlighted trade disputes—stretching back 
as far as the ‘garlic war’ of 2000—as examples of the perils of a rising China.29 
 
At the same time as Seoul and Beijing were trading opinions about the ownership 
of Goguryeo, the ROK was forced to ponder a less secure future, one in which 
the American alliance might be less sturdy than some Koreans would prefer. The 
reduction of US troops based in South Korea, which began in acrimonious 
circumstances in 2004, looks set to continue regardless of whether progressives 
or conservatives lead Korea and the US. In the context of the war on terror, the 
American force presence in the ROK became topical during the early years of the 
Bush administration. In keeping with Donald Rumsfeld’s push for a more flexible 
global configuration of its troops, the US sought to change the mission statement 
of the military presence in Korea from merely the defence of the South to a wider 
‘roving commission’ throughout East Asia. The ROK opposed this reconfiguration 
of US military assets in East Asia, on the grounds that ‘strategic flexibility’ could 
well imply the use of Korea-based American forces against China in the Taiwan 
Strait—or against North Korea—without the assent of ROK.30 
 
A related issue was which party—the US or the ROK—would exercise control of 
the Combined Forces Command (CFC). That is, would an American or Korean 
command Korean forces in the incidence of a conflict on the peninsula? Whereas 
Korea assumed peacetime control of its own forces in the 1990s, wartime control 
                                                 
29 See, respectively, Scott Snyder, ‘A Dark Turn in Political Relations’, Comparative Connections 
9, no. 1 (2007), 112; Snyder, ‘Political Fallout from North Korea’s Nuclear Test’, Comparative 
Connections 8, no. 4 (2007), 120; Jae Ho Chung, ‘From a Special Relationship to a Normal 
Partnership? Interpreting the “Garlic Battle” in Sino–South Korean Relations’, Pacific Affairs 76, 
no. 4 (2003): 549–68. 
30 Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China’, 381–2. 
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still remains in American hands. In 2006, Rumsfeld announced that wartime 
control would revert to the ROK by 2009. While this was sooner than the Korean 
side preferred, and the date was later pushed back to 2012, even this later date 
was unsatisfactory for conservative Korean politicians and military officials. Both 
serving and retired military officers are highly critical of this stance, arguing that 
the reversion to Korean control is premature and detrimental to national 
security.31 In any case, Rumsfeld’s concept of flexible basing appears to have 
outlived his term as Secretary of Defence, as witnessed by efforts to bolster 
America’s offshore presence in Guam and Saipan.  
 
A complicating factor here is the perennially uneasy state of Japan–ROK 
relations. The dissolution of the USSR weakens the rationale for the American 
presence in Northeast Asia. At the same time the War on Terror has encouraged 
the US to reconfigure its forces in the region in such a way that they can react in 
a more flexible manner to contingencies both in the immediate vicinity and 
beyond. The US wants its allies to accept a larger share of the burden of 
ensuring regional stability. The most obvious candidate here is Japan, which has 
one of the biggest economies in the world yet a relatively low level of defence 
spending. The scale and sophistication of Japan’s military is nonetheless 
substantial, and Japanese forces have increasingly shed the constraints of the 
Peace Constitution. While the US supports the ongoing normalisation of Japan’s 
foreign policy, South Korea argues that Japan has yet to adequately atone for its 
wartime past and that it is unfit to play a bigger role in the region. 
 
Ideally, from the US point of view, South Korea and Japan would combine to help 
counterbalance and indeed contain China in the region. The US expects its 
liberal–democratic allies to again act as a bulwark to China in the post-cold war 
era. However the new containment strategy contains at least two glaring 
shortcomings: the continuing division of the Korean Peninsula and the ongoing 
                                                 
31 Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea (Washington, D.C.: 
Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 166–75. See also Donald Kirk, ‘Another Korean “War” Casualty’, 
Asia Times, 16 February 2008, at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/JB16Dg01.html. 
 16
enmity in Korean–Japanese relations. South Koreans are inherently suspicious 
of Japanese ambitions in the region. The ROK’s protestations against a ‘normal’ 
Japan therefore also complicate its relations with the US, which views any 
tensions between Japan and Korea as very much a secondary issue compared 
to the problem of a more powerful China. 
 
Assessing the Sunshine Policy 
Despite China and the ROK pouring so much diplomatic effort into the Six Party 
Talks, North Korea failed to account for its nuclear programme by the end of 
2007. Talks resumed in 2008, with another round of promises that the North 
would account for its nuclear-related activities and definitively close its programs. 
 
In spite of these unsatisfactory outcomes, both the conservative and progressive 
sides of South Korean politics remain committed to aid programs for North 
Korea. Regardless of the new president’s rhetoric, the architect of the Sunshine 
Policy predicts that it will remain the mainstream in North Korean policy. On the 
new president, Kim Dae-jung was recently quoted as saying: ‘Lee is also making 
some changes. I realize he was arguing with my policy... but I think he will come 
to accept it’.32 
 
China too has a substantial investment in the North, insofar as a collapse in the 
DPRK would be a bad precedent for other communist states in Asia. It would 
also be bad policy, in that China does not want an easy or quick unification on 
terms favourable to South Korea and the US. China, instead, prefers a more 
gradual path to reconciliation that slowly leads to unification. By slowing the pace 
of Korean unification, the likelihood of further withdrawals of US troops from East 
Asia—and the scaling back of the US–Japan alliance—would increase. On the 
other hand, China is predisposed to Korean unification because a permanent 
division of the peninsula would set a bad precedent for Tibet and Taiwan. For 
                                                 
32 Donald Kirk, ‘Back to the Hard Line on North Korea’, Asia Times, 26 April 2008, at: 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/JD26Dg01.html. See also Lankov, ‘Staying Alive’, 16. 
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these reasons, China will remain heavily engaged in the North Korean affairs for 
the foreseeable future. 
 
Policy coordination over the last decade between China and the ROK has proven 
to be effective in economic and technical matters, but comparatively less so in 
political ones. This is evidenced by China’s unwillingness to side with the ROK 
against Pyongyang, and by Chinese sensitivity about potential infringements of 
its own sovereignty. China’s willingness to override humanitarian concerns about 
the fate of refugees in the border region only underlines this tendency. 
Consequently policy coordination has survived to the extent that China and the 
ROK can each claim to be achieving their goals in terms of North Korea. 
 
However the point may be approaching when what China views as the cautious 
liberalisation of the North’s economy free of political change becomes 
incompatible with the Sunshine Policy. Sunshine, which envisages economic 
openness as sewing the seeds precisely for the type of political transformation 
that the Chinese leadership seeks to avoid, represents regime change from 
within. If China proves unwilling to abet this transformation, its utility to the ROK 
as a diplomatic partner becomes more circumscribed. As a result the return to a 
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